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MUSICAL PARODY: DERIVATIVE USE
OR FAIR USE?
Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp*
Authors' legal rights have escaped exact definition for most of his-
tory, despite early recognition that an author has some economic rights
in his work.' Nonetheless, a fundamental assumption, embodied in the
Constitution,' exists that guarantees an author that the fruits of his labor
will serve to promote "science and [the] useful arts."3 The assumption is
effectuated by the protection afforded authors through the copyright
laws.4 This protection has covered musical compositions for over a cen-
tury and a half' and continues to embrace "musical works, including any
accompanying words." 6 In addition to the music and the lyrics, the law
equally protects derivative works.7
Unfortunately, the protection accorded such works can never be ab-
solute since, as one commentator has suggested, "[o]ne of the principal
circumstances of our condition is that we are at times compelled by
events, need or our weak nature to borrow from the expression of
others."8 Thus, the longstanding judicial doctrine of fair use,9 recently
* B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1983. J.D., Catholic University, 1986. Admitted to
practice in Virginia, 1986. Currently, Judge Advocate General Corps (Marine Corps).
1. An early history of copyright can be found in BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY
AND LAW, 8-28 (1912).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
3. Copyright law in America is antedated by the English Tradition of Copyright. See
Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 586 (1956). The Ameri-
can colonies, save Delaware, each enacted copyright legislation before the Constitution was
enacted. U.S. Copyright Off. Bull. No. 3, Copyright Enactments of the United States, 1783-
1900 (1906). It is interesting to note that the copyright clause was approved at the Constitu-
tional Convention without debate. See Fenning, The Origin of the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109, 111 (1929).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1982).
5. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, c.16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (1982).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1977). A derivative work has been defined as one which is substan-
tially copied from the prior work. See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 387 F.
Supp. 869 (D.C.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980
(1977).
8. Leavens, In Defense of the Unauthorized Use: Recent Developments in Defining Copy-
right Infringement, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 3 (1981).
9. The first intimation of a fair use defense occurred in Folson v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841). The actual use of the term "fair use" first occurred in Laurence v. Dana,
15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1976,10 has served to limit the
monopoly which the copyright laws provide.
The Copyright Act of 1976 includes as fair use "criticism" and
"comment." 11 Parody has been placed within these terms. The inclusion
of parody within these broad and ambiguous words has decreased greatly
the ability of some authors and composers to enjoy fully the benefits of
their work, causing some professional frustration, embarrassment, and
lost revenues.
The detriment done to the music industry from parodists who tend
to use most, if not all, of a popular song to ridicule a particular social
condition, character or the song itself results in more harm than good to
the arts. 2 By merely copying large parts of, or the entire musical score
to, a song the parodist no more engages in artistic creativity than does
the plagiarist. More often than not, the parodist merely changes the
words. 3 The contribution such efforts make to the "useful arts" is ques-
tionable. The damage it does, in the form of lost revenues and product
disparagement,' 4 to the song parodied is not.
This essay will explore the contradiction between permitting musi-
cal parody and the goal of the copyright laws of promoting the "useful
arts." After briefly reviewing the purposes of the copyright laws, the
concept of fair use and its treatment in court decisions will be discussed.
The essay then argues that the true goals of the copyright laws are not
served, but actually subverted, when musical parody is permitted as a fair
use. A parody of a copyrighted song which utilizes most or all of the
music of the original song has a greater likelihood of causing more harm
than good, both economically and artistically. Such wholesale copying
should be viewed with great skepticism by the courts, and should be per-
mitted only when the values or ideas under attack are clearly recogniza-
ble and where there is a concerted effort to minimize the amount of the
10. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
11. Id.
12. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976) (hereinafter "H. Rep. at ").
13. E.g., Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Brodcasting, Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd per curiam, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (the "I Love New York" theme was changed to
"I Love Sodom," using the same melody).
14. Product disparagement occurs where the product's quality or characteristics are
denegrated by false or misleading statements which influence or tend to influence the public
not to buy that product. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Since the "effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work" is one of the four
stated factors to consider in determining whether or not a use is "fair" (17 U.S.C. § 107(4)), it
would appear that disparagement was intended to be a consideration. See D.C. Comics, Inc. v.





The constitutional purpose of copyright protection is the promotion
of the literary, scientific, and musical arts. 6 These arts are encouraged
by "securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."17 The unarticulated
assumption is that guaranteeing "Authors" a monopoly in their work
will result in a utilization of their talents for monetary gain. 8 The pro-
tection afforded authors is the ability to sue, for injunction and for dam-
ages, those who infringe their copyrights.' 9 Most infringement actions
involve the copying of particular parts or pieces, rather than verbatim
copying of an entire work.2" Often, this fact and the failure of copyright
to protect the idea or information involved 2 result in difficult factual
determinations in infringement cases.22
Musical compositions came within the purview of copyright protec-
tion in 1831.23 When courts have reviewed copyright infringement
claims of composers the murky waters traversed closely resemble similar
15. This essay does not consider the issue of impersonators whose humor is generally in
imitating the voice of the person in question, and whose use of copyrighted music may more
clearly be an incidental one. See Green v. Minzensheimer, 177 F. 286 (C.C.N.Y. 1909);
Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C. Pa. 1903). In the same vein is Italian Book Corp.
v. American Broadcasting Cos., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), holding that a song played
on a band float and broadcast in a news story featuring the parade was a fair use, incidental to
the primary feature. Where, however, the use in background is intentionally designed to have
an effect the outcome may be different. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp.,
389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
16. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
17. Id.
18. Society's interest in providing copyright protection is not the pecuniary gain of authors
but rather to place in the public domain "the general benefits derived ... from the labors of
authors." Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). This is best accomplished by
providing authors with sufficient economic incentive. The author's personal gain will act to
advance society's interest. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Universal City Stu-
dios v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); 1 M. NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] at 1-31 to -32.1 (1986). But see Light, Parody,
Burlesque and the Economic Rationale for Copyright, 11 CONN. L. REv. 615, 618-21 (1979).
19. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-510 (1982). Section 501(a) defines infringement as the violation of
"any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118, or
who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602 ...."
20. There are, of course, cases where verbatim copying of entire works was at issue. E.g.,
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
21. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 107-08 (1974) (hereinafter "S. Rep. at -
"); H. Rep. at 56-57.
22. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. at 217; Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 101 etseq. (1982). Unauthorized public performance of copyrighted musi-
cal material was barred by the Act of Jan., 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481.
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infringement claims raised by authors.24 As with all other copyrights,
musical copyrights grant a variety of exclusive rights, including rights of
reproduction, distribution, performance, display, and adaptation.25
Adaptatation, as used in the Act, includes derivative works.26
The inclusion of derivative works in the list of exclusive rights
should allow an author to control parodies as well as non-parodies, be-
cause both "recast, transform, or adapt" the original work.27 In musical
parody this is even more appropriate, since such parodies tend to use the
entire musical score, parodying only the lyrics.28 The derivative nature
of musical parody seems self-evident; 29 since the purpose of parody is to
conjure up the original work in the audience's mind the parodist must
appropriate a sufficient amount of the work to achieve recognition by the
audience. Often, courts considering parodies quickly brush over the
question of infringement altogether, merely assuming that without fair
use, infringement exists.3 ° A musical parody which changes only the
lyrics is clearly based upon a preexisting work, and thus need only meet
the standard that the original may be "recast, transformed or adapted"
in that manner to fall within the derivative use definition.
No matter what may happen in the appellate opinions, at the trial
level, before the fair use defense can be considered in any case in which
infringement is claimed, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
work actually infringed upon his copyrighted original. Only then may
the defendant proceed to assert the statutory defense of fair use.
The prima facie case in an infringement claim requires a showing by
24. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. at 1397; Associ-
ated Music Publishers v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 46 F. Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd,
141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 766 (1944).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
26. The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as "a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a... musical arrangement .... sound record .... or any other form
in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
27. Comment, Parody and Fair Use: The Critical Question, 57 WASH. L. REV. 163, 166
(1981).
28. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 389 F. Supp. 1397 (1975); Elsmere Music, Inc. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741. One need only listen to the records recorded by
Weird Al Yenkowitch (Yankovich), such as "Like a Surgeon" parodying Madonna's "Like a
Virgin" to realize the extent to which some musical parodists copy the score of the original
work. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Yenkovich apparently obtains permission from
the original recording artist before plying his trade.
29. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434-35 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). This court also noted that
"[a]s an analytical matter.., it would seem contradictory to assert that copying for parodic




the plaintiff that she possesses a valid copyright for the original work,
and that an unauthorized copying of the copyrighted work by the de-
fendant has occurred.3 2 Copying is generally proven by showing access
to the copyrighted work-defined by one court as "the opportunity that
an alleged infringer has to see or hear the copyrighted work" 33-and a
substantial similarity to the original-"whether an average lay observer
would recognize one work as having been appropriated from another."34
Once the plaintiff has established aprimafacie case for infringement
the defendant may raise the fair use defense. As noted earlier, proving
infringement in a parody case is rarely difficult.3" A defendant usually
copies the original as part of the scheme of his criticism or comedy.
Often the defendant will admit copying. Thus, parody cases usually turn
on whether defendant's use of the original was a fair one within the
meaning of Section 107 of the Copyright Act.
FAIR USE
While the copyright laws grant a wide range of protection to au-
thors, the monopoly is far from complete.36 The courts have curtailed
authors' monopolies by limiting the protection to the expressions, but not
the ideas.3 7 Additionally, an infringement occurs only where the second
work is substantially similar to the original. 38 Generally, substantial sim-
ilarity is determined on the basis of the ordinary observer-whether the
average individual would conclude that the two works were substantially
similar.3" Neither of these exceptions would permit parody, especially
musical parody, since parody, in order to achieve its ostensible critical
31. Copyright registration consitutes prima facie evidence of copyright validity. 17 U.S.C.
§ 410(c) (1982).
32. See Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981);
Silverman v. CBS, 632 F. Supp. 1344, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
33. Selle v. Gibb, 567 F. Supp. 1173, 1181 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir.
1984)(claim for copyright infringement against the Bee Gees denied where plaintiff failed to
show affirmatively, or rebut defendants' evidence to the contrary, that defendants had ever
seen the score to plaintiff's song or heard plaintiff's song played).
34. Silverman, 632 F. Supp. at 1351-52; Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
35. Dees, 794 F.2d at 434-35.
36. In addition to the fair use exception, the duration of the copyright, for example, is
limited by Section 302 of the 1976 Act to the life of the author plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (1982).
37. E.g., Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217-18; Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1982). See, e.g., L & L White Metal Casting Corp. v. Joseph, 387 F.
Supp. 1349 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Fristot v. First Am. Natural Ferns Co., 251 F. Supp. 886
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); 1 M. NiMMER, § 13.03[A].
39. Silverman, 632 F. Supp. at 1351-52.
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purpose, is intended to be substantially similar in some fashion." There-
fore, parody4 requires some other defense if it is to survive. That de-
fense is the doctrine of fair use.42
The fair use defense is a judicially created doctrine, equitable in na-
ture.43 It was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976," whose drafters
intended that the courts remain "free to adapt the doctrine to particular
situations on a case-by-case basis."' 45 Thus, section 107 of the Copyright
Act was not an attempt to "freeze" the law, but merely to "restate the
[then] present judicial doctrine of fair use."'4 6 The doctrine has a long,
rocky history47 and has been applied for a multitude of reasons. Most
courts agree, however, that the doctrine is fundamentally equitable, and
must therefore be enforced according to the dictates of public policy.
48
The codification of the fair use doctrine permits use, without con-
sent, "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research."4 9 Section 107 provides four "factors to be con-
sidered" by courts faced with the fair use defense:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.5 °
40. See Comment, supra note 27, at 167 n.28 for a discussion of whether parody falls
within the purview of satire. See also Comment, Beyond Fair Use: Putting Satire In Its Proper
Place, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 518 (1985) (using parody and satire interchangeably).
41. Comment, supra note 27 at 164-66.
42. It is generally easier to perceive the concept of fair use as an affirmative defense rather
than a non-infringing activity. See H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY
PROBLEMS 260 (1944); M. NIMMER, supra note 18, at § 13.05. This is because the fair use
defense generally arises when infringement is either admitted, or aprimafacie case of infringe-
ment has been shown. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct.
Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Holdredge v. Knight Publish-
ing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
43. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 448-49.
44. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
45. See supra note 21, at 62.
46. See supra note 12.
47. See Leavens, supra note 8. One court has called it "the most troublesome issue in the
law of copyright." Dallas v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
48. See, e.g., Leavens, supra note 8, at 6; M. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 13.03.




The list is not conclusive."
The doctrine's purpose is to achieve a balance between the monop-
oly rights of the author and the actual goal of copyright law, stimulation
of the arts. "[C]ourts[,] in passing upon particular claims of infringe-
ment[,] must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a
maximum financial return to the greater public interest in the develop-
ment of art, science and industry."52 Thus, where the copied work
would not result in a retardation in the development of the arts by dis-
couraging creativity (as a result of lessened economic return) or would be
neutral in its effects, the parodist's right to copy the original in a quantity
sufficient to achieve her goal should be permissible. This is recognized in
section 107 by the emphasis placed on market factors and the require-
ment of substantiality. The strong connection between creative incentive
and economic reward acts as the yardstick against which promotion of
the arts is measured. One can foresee then, that allowing a "fair use,"
where the end result would be to discourage the original author by al-
lowing a later user to steal his profits, would necessarily stifle the devel-
opment of the arts. There can be no second use if there is no first. Under
the copyright law, the only fair use is one which does not unnecessarily
steal the benefits of the original author's labors.
The fair use defense has been the subject of two recent Supreme
Court cases. The first, Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. " considered whether the use of home video recording de-
vices to record copyrighted motion pictures and audiovisual works
should render the manufacturer of those machines, Sony, liable to the
copyright holders. Although the focus in Sony was on the vicarious lia-
bility of the manufacturers for infringement by the purchasers of home
video recorders,54 a substantial portion of the opinion addressed the fair
use doctrine.5 The significance of fair use to the Sony case was the possi-
bility for noninfringing as well as infringing uses. In remarking on this
possibility the Court focused primarily on the fourth factor in section 107
of the Act, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work."5 6
51. See supra note 12, at 61.
52. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822
(1964). See also H. BALL, supra note 32, § 125, at 260; Rosemont Enterprises v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
53. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
54. Id. at 434-46.
55. Id. at 447-57. The dissenters also discussed the fair use doctrine at great length. Id. at
475-86.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982).
1987]
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Justice Stevens, who delivered the majority opinion, discussed the
impact of copying an entire work on the original work's market, pointing
out that, under subsection one, where the copying is for a "commercial
or profitmaking purpose, such use [is] presumptively . . .unfair." ' 7
Although copying for commercial use was not the case in Sony, 8 Justice
Stevens' opinion considered subsection four of section 107 extremely im-
portant because "[e]ven copying for noncommercial purposes may im-
pair the copyright holder's ability to obtain the rewards that Congress
intended him to have."59 In determining whether a use, commercial or
not, infringed an existing copyright, there must be a "demonstrable effect
upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work."'
Where the use is commercial, this effect would be presumed, and the
burden would shift to the defendant to show that his use did not ad-
versely affect the copyright holder's existing or potential market.6" The
protection includes present and future effects as well as derivative uses.62
"What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. If the intended use is
for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. ' 63 In Sony, the
plaintiffs failed to show, as is their burden when the use in question is
noncommercial, that home video recording would sufficiently harm their
copyrights to warrant a finding of infringement."'
One year later the Supreme Court faced the fair use doctrine
squarely in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,65 when
it considered the validity of The Nation's printing of an article containing
excerpts from President Ford's memoirs, the rights to which had been
previously licensed to Time magazine. This time the Court, in an opin-
57. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449. (These "rewards" are the profits generated through sales
of the original by its producer.)
58. Id. at 448-49. The real issue was whether non-commercial home use should render
VCR/VHS manufacturers liable.
59. Id. at 450.
60. Id.
61. See generally id. at 450-52.
62. Id. at 451.
63. Id.
64. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 456. (The dissent in Sony, written by Justice Blackmun, em-
phasized that a finding of fair use depended on "whether, under the circumstances, it is reason-
able to expect the user to bargain with the copyright owner for use of the work." Id. at 479.
Blackmun concluded that an infringement could be shown by proving only that "a potential
for harm" to the market value of the original existed, id. at 482, and that a rebuttal of this
showing would require the infringer to "demonstrate that he had not impaired the copyright
holder's ability to demand compensation" for the work. Id. at 485. Blackmun finished by
asserting that the fact that a market would not have been open to the copyright holder without
the infringer's activities does not justify exploitation of the market without compensation.) Id.
65. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
[Vol. 7
MUSICAL PARODY
ion written by Justice O'Connor, refused to hold the unauthorized use a
fair one.66 In Harper & Row, as in Sony, the Court's emphasis was decid-
edly placed on the effect that the use had on the marketability of the
original work. Thus, Justice O'Connor wrote that "[tihe crux of the
[matter] is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the price."'6 7 The copyright holder need only
establish "a causal connection between the infringement and a loss of
revenue" to fulfill his burden of proof.6" The infringer may then rebut
this by fulfilling the difficult task of proving that the damage to the
copryight holder's market would have occurred without the
infringement.69
Justice O'Connor's statements show a strong tendency to afford
greater consideration to the market effects of infringement. The Harper
& Row decision went even further than did Sony. In stressing the impact
of an infringement on the original work's market, Justice O'Connor in-
cluded in the calulation the harm that an infringing use would have on
nonexistent, but potential, markets for the copyrighted work.7 ° Thus, she
stressed that the "inquiry must take account not only of harm to the
original but also of harm to the market for derivative works."' 71 The
opinion, relying on the Senate Report, suggested that a " 'use that sup-
plants any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work [is] an
infringement.' "72 The Court held The Nation's prepublication infringe-
ment to be outside the scope of fair use and thus held the defendants
liable.
Harper & Row and Sony illustrate the Court's focus on the market
impact of a potentially infringing work. While the amount taken, the
nature of the use and the purpose of the use are not abandoned, fair use,
as it relates to uses which are not claimed as educational but which may
be commercial or noncommercial, turns primarily on the harm that the
use has on the original's existing or potential markets. 73 After Harper &
Row and Sony it is clear that where a use noticeably impacts on the mar-
66. Id. at 569. (The copying in question concerned an article of approximately 2250
words, of which 300 to 400 words were from the original work.)
67. Id. at 562.
68. Id. at 567.
69. Id.
70. 471 U.S. at 568.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975), (emphasis added).
73. This factor has been referred to as "the most important, and indeed, central fair use
factor." 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[B], at 13-89 (1986). The impor-
tance of this factor has also been recognized by several circuit courts. Horgan v. MacMillan,
1987]
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ket or potential market of the original-including derivative uses-in-
fringement has occurred. This analysis would, of necessity, include
musical parodies which tend to use substantial amounts of the original
work and compete directly (or indirectly) with the original in the market.
The importance of the work's marketability has been recognized
generally,74 although courts are not always precise in their handling of
the question.75 Generally, though, where a subsequent use has had or is
likely to have a significant effect on the market of the original, the fair use
defense will not be successful.76
The Supreme Court's recent emphasis on the effect of the latter
work on the original's potential market should not be mistaken for a
deemphasis on section 107's other factors. As several recent fair use
cases illustrate, a court may rely on any or all factors, and may even
consider additional factors.7 7
The first factor listed in section 107 for consideration by the courts
is "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."'78  This
actually requires a court to consider two things; the overall purpose of
the work- educational, critical, news etc.-and the commercial or
profit-making purpose. Generally, courts focus on whether the purpose
was for profit or nonprofit (or a combination thereof) before confronting
the more general purpose and character of the work.7 9
Where a defendant's use is "of a commercial nature" there is a pre-
sumption that the use is "an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privi-
lege that belongs to the owner of the copyright."8" This does not mean
that finding that a use is commercial in nature requires a court to reject
Inc., 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986); Pro Arts, Inc. v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 787 F.2d 592, 594
(6th Cir. 1986).
74. See M. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 13.05[A][4]; Leavens, supra note 8, at 7-8. See also
S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975).
75. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973); Italian Book
Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Leavens,
supra note 8, at 7-12.
76. See supra note 52.
77. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986); D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited
Monkey Business, 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1) (1982).
79. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority, 796 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1986);
Consumers Union of United States v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 823 (1984).
80. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451. (At least one court has stated, however, that the business
activities of non-profit groups should be "treated more liberally than the business of profit




the fair use defense. Rather, it is a relevant factor to be weighed in the
overall determination, albeit a factor which weighs against a fair use de-
fense.81 The same relative conclusion applies to non-commercial uses. A
non-commercial use does not necessitate a finding of fair use.8 2 The dis-
cussion in fair use cases dedicated to the commercial/nonprofit question
demonstrates the important role subsection one continues to play where
the fair use defense is raised.
Section 107(1) also requires the court to consider the overall "pur-
pose and character of the use."83 Courts have interpreted this to permit
an inquiry into the equitable circumstances surrounding the defendant's
use.84 Thus, where excerpts from a plaintiff's book were published ver-
batim in defendant's newspaper and where the defendants admitted that
they knew permission to copy the copyrighted material was required,
subsection one was properly relied upon by a district court in finding that
the fair use defense was not applicable.85 Defendant's good faith remains
a proper issue for consideration by courts faced with a fair use defense.8 6
The second fair use factor which the court must consider is "the
nature of the copyrighted work."187 This factor has generally focused on
the creative versus factual function of the work. When dealing with
copyrighted works which are primarily factual (historical, educational,
etc.) the law "generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate" the
information. 8 On the other hand, works which can be categorized as
81. See the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 579; Hus-
tler Magazine, 606 F. Supp. at 1534 n.l (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("Commercial motivation does not in
and of itself preclude a finding of fair use"); see also 3 NIMMER, supra note 73, § 13.05[A] at
13-70 n.24.
82. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, 606 F. Supp. at 1534 n.1; Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d
1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1) (1982).
84. See generally Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
85. Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296, 1300-01 (D.D.C. 1985); see also Marcus, 695
F.2d at 1175-76; Iowa State University Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621
F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980).
86. The morality of the content of defendant's work is not generally considered in deter-
mining defendant's motive, E.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2) (1982). One court has called this factor "the least important and
the most unclear .... Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
88. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. This may not apply to unpublished works because, as
the Supreme Court has indicated, "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author's right to con-
trol the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair
use." Id. at 556. The broad use of the term "public appearance" indicates that this rule would
apply equally to musical expressions. But see 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 73 § 13.05 [A], at 13-
75 n.28. le ("A categorical presumption against prepublication fair use cannot harmonize with
the statutory scheme").
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primarily "creative"-those whose main purpose is entertainment 89-do
not present this social need for broad dissemination. Thus, cases opining
on this factor hold that the fair use defense more readily applies to fac-
tual than creative works.90
In addition to the creative/factual distinction, courts also look at the
natural distribution limitations of the original work. For instance, works
of limited circulation may be accorded greater protection than works
designed for mass distribution.91 Although this is not often an issue in
parody cases, it remains a concern for most fair use cases. In recent
times, largely due to the Supreme Court's Harper & Row opinion, the
focus of debate has shifted to questions of prepublication use.92 How-
ever, the question remains a required one under section 107, and there-
fore courts continue to give weight to the distribution channels of the
original.
The fact that some courts are concerned with distribution channels
when they consider the nature and purpose of the work indicates either a
lack of understanding in the application of the fair use doctrine, or an
inevitable shading of the lines between the four factors which must be
considered. In either event, concern for distribution and circulation are
more appropriately discussed under the fourth element, the effect of the
use on the copyright holder's potential market, since means and extent of
circulation are more market concerns and less related to whether the
work is factual or creative (although the particular facts or impressions
may affect the market as well).
Before reaching the focal question of effect on potential market, the
court must also consider "the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."93 This requires the
court to "weigh the significance of the copying both in terms of the quan-
tity and quality of the alleged infringement." 94 In so doing a court will
look at whether the portion used was an essential element of the original
work as well as the substantial similarity of the works.
89. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
90. See, e.g., Pacific and Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1497 (11th Cir. 1984)
("The importance to society of... news could affect the definition of fair use .... ); Dow
Jones & Co., 546 F. Supp. at 120 ("Authors of compilations... must be held to grant broader
licenses for subsequent use than persons whose work is truly creative"); Hustler Magazine, 796
F.2d at 1154 ("[tlhe creative nature of the parody means that the scope of fair use in this case
is less than the scope of fair use for informational works").
91. See, e.g., supra note 12 at 73 and supra note 21 at 64.
92. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, § 1305[A], at 13-74 to -75.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982).
94. Hustler Magazine, 606 F. Supp. at 1537. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, § 13.05[A],
at 13-78 and cases cited.
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At least one court, the Ninth Circuit, has "consistently focused" on
the inquiry of amount and substantiality of the taking.9" When consider-
ing a fair use defense, that court is not as likely to protect" 'copying that
is virtually complete or almost verbatim,' "96 but there is no "fixed limit"
on copying. Rather, the fair user may only use as much as is necessary to
accomplish her goal. In the case of parody, this means that the parodist
may only use what is "necessary to place firmly in the reader's mind the
parodied work and those specific attributes that [were] to be satirized."
97
The Ninth Circuit developed a three part test to determine whether
a taking was excessive under the cirumstances. The three elements "sin-
gled out" by the court are: 1) "the degree of public recognition of the
original work in the chosen work;" 2) "the ease of conjuring up the origi-
nal work in the chosen medium;" and 3) "the focus of the parody."9'
The test is adaptable to most circumstances where the amount and sub-
stantiality of the taking are of importance. Thus, the Second Circuit,
when considering a case which asked whether a published series of pho-
tographs of the Nutcracker Ballet violated the choreographer's
coypright, rejected the notion that infringement requires that an amount
sufficient to "recreate" the original be copied.99 Instead, the Second Cir-
cuit reiterated Judge Hand's test: whether "the ordinary observer [public
recognition in the Ninth Circuit's words], unless he set out to detect the
disparities, would be disposed to overlook them [the ease of conjuring up
the original], and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same [focus of the
work]."' Both "tests" recognize that the medium used for the copy
will affect the similarity required, and, as such, may also determine the
amount needed to be copied.1°  Thus, "[e]ven a small amount of the
original, if it is qualitatively significant, may be sufficient to be an in-
fringement .... 2
For the parodist, the focus is properly shifted to whether the parody
"could easily have been accomplished through more restricted
95. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438.
96. Id. (quoting Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). Accord Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623
F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam). For a contrasting view, see MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677
F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
97. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 758. Cf Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 162 (2d
Cir. 1986) (Copying "[e]ven a small amount of the original ... may be sufficient to be an
infringement .... ").
98. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 439.
99. Horgan, 789 F.2d at 162.
100. Id. (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960)).
101. Horgan, 789 F.2d at 162; Fisher, 794 F.2d at 439.
102. Horgan, 789 F.2d at 162 (emphasis added).
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means." ° Here, the second prong of the Ninth Circuit's test weighs
heavily. If the parody is presented in the same medium as the original,
the court will look to see if an effective parody requires "exact or near-
exact copying."'" The court will then balance the parodist's desire to
make the best parody against the constitutionally guaranteed rights of
the copyright holder. The fair use test does not guarantee the best par-
ody-or even a good parody. It only permits sufficient taking for an "ef-
fective" parody. Unfortunately, this necessitates some sort of qualitative
judgment as to the parody's effectiveness, 0 5 an extremely subjective and
elusive process.
PARODY
Parody, considered to be a form of comment or criticism, has often
been claimed as a fair use.'0 6 The legislative history of the Copyright Act
of 1976 also indicates that "comment" and "criticism" as used in section
107 were intended to encompass parody.' 7 Whether a particular parody
is a fair use will, of course, depend on the particular circumstances. 0 8
103. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 439. The Ninth Circuit has opened a large can of worms by use of
the word "easily" in this context. Arguably, it waters down the test to the point where it
cannot be effective. If a parodist need only prove it would have been "difficult" for him to use
a more restricted means of accomplishing his goal, the burden is minimal. Instead, an enlight-
ened court should interpret this as either a judicial slip, or a tip that while the parodist must
make a concerted effort to use the least restrictive means, the court will not entertain unfore-
seeable possibilities as arguments from the copyright holder. A reasonableness test could read-
ily be applied to the parodist's efforts in this area.
104. Id. See also Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 758 ("[When the medium involved is a comic
book, a recognizable caricature is not difficult to draw ....").
105. While courts try to shy away from deciding on the subjective quality of the work (is it
good or bad), one district court judge has devised a fifth factor for determining fair use and
minimizing subjectivity: whether the work "incidentally parod[ies] other works while creating
a genuinely distinct product" or whether it "comprise[s] little more than an adaptation of
another's original work." D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, 598 F. Supp. 110,
119 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (Shoob, J.). This factor is consistent with an earlier statement from that
district that a parody must "make some critical comment or statement about the original work
which reflects the original perspective of the parodist-thereby giving the parody social value
beyond its entertainment function. Otherwise, any comic use of an existing work would be
protected ..." MGM, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., 479 F. Supp. 351, 357 (N.D.
Ga. 1979). These opinions have at least attempted to come to grips with the question of
effectiveness.
106. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, 600 F.2d 1184 (5th
Cir. 1979) (topless Cowboy Cheerleaders); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (Disney characters in promiscuous presenta-
tion); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Cos., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
per curiam, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
108. See Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
907 (1957); Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Higgins v. Baker, 309 F.
MUSICAL PARODY
Those cases which have held that the charged infringement was not
a fair use have recognized that, while borrowing from the original is nec-
essary for parody to succeed,"° as with any subsequent use, when too
much is taken the parodist has, under the guise of comedy or satire, done
little more than altered minimal specific attributes and thus infringed on
the original." 0 The test used to determine whether too much of the orig-
inal has been used is based on the "conjure up" theory.I' The parodist
is only permitted to use as much of the work as is necessary to identify it
as a parody of that work." 2 This test, while quantitative in nature, rec-
ognizes the need for the parodist to borrow substantial amounts of the
original if his parody is to be effective." 3
The "conjure up" doctrine did not appear until a California district
court rejected its application in Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. ("Gaslight").114 The fair use defense was raised by come-
dian Jack Benny in response to a charge of copyright infringement by the
makers of the very popular movie "Gaslight." Benny, in a half-hour tele-
vision comedy called "Autolight," copied the plot and story line, as well
as most of the script of "Gaslight." The only ascertainable difference
was the actions of the actors, i.e., walking on their hands."II The court,
relying on prior rationales, denied the defense of fair use, holding that the
author of the original would not have consented to such a complete use
Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Holdredge v. Knight Publishing, 214 F. Supp. 921 (C.D. Cal.
1963).
109. Leavens, supra note 8, at 18 ("Without a notion of the thing being lampooned, com-
prehension of the parodist's point of view is lost, and the parody fails").
110. D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984),
("Superstud" and "Wonderwench" singing telegrams using Superman and Wonderwoman
costumes); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir.
1979) (topless depiction in otherwise full uniform); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581
F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (Disney characters doing un-Disneylike things); Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979), (Scarlet
Fever remake of Gone With the Wind); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) (rogue adaptation of The Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy
of Company C); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (Mickey Mouse March as background to sex scene); Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom, Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d
532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (contortions not enough when plot unchanged).
111. See supra note 57.
112. Id. See also Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438, where the plaintiff argued that the test should be
interpreted to limit the amount of permissible copying to "that amount necessary to evoke only
initial recognition in the listener." The court rejected this "rigid view" and held instead that
the conjure up test requires flexible application, which in parody means permitting use of
enough of the original to make its humorous point. Id. at 438-39.
113. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
114. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
115. Loew's, Inc., 131 F. Supp. at 170.
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of his work.1 16  The Supreme Court, without opinion, affirmed the
decision. 1
1 7
The same trial court, later in the same year, again addressed the
parody issue in Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 118
deciding this time that Sid Caesar's television skit "From Here to Obscu-
rity" was a fair use of the story line of "From Here to Eternity," another
popular movie. 1 9 This time the court stated in dicta that parody may
use just enough of the original to "conjure up" in the audience's mind
that which is the subject of criticism. 120 But, since the defendant's use in
that case did not constitute a prima facie infringement in the court's
mind,1 21 the decision merely expresses some general principles which do
little to define just how much borrowing is permissible.
About a decade later, in Berlin v. E.C. Publications,'22 the Second
Circuit approved the "conjure up" test. The court in Berlin, holding
Mad Magazine's parodies of plaintiff's songs to be a fair use, joined the
"conjure up" doctrine with the market effect concept subsequently codi-
fied in section 107(4). 123 The court found that "neither the intent nor the
effect of fulfilling the demand for the original" had occurred, and there-
fore the use was permissible.124 While the amount taken was integral to
the decision, the final judgment also depended on the intended or actual
effect on the market potential of the original.
Following the Copyright Act of 1976, these factors appear to be
controlling.'25 In subsequent parody cases it has become apparent that
the integral relationship between these factors has shown that unless both
occur, the fair use defense should stand. In Walt Disney Productions v.
Air Pirates, 12 6 for instance, the fair use defense was raised in response to
116. Id. at 180.
117. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
118. 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
119. Columbia Pictures, 137 F. Supp. at 348.
120. Id. at 350.
121. Id. at 352.
122. 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964).
123. Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545.
124. Id.
125. 17 U.S.C. § 107(b) of the Copyright Act, lists four factors for consideration; only two
of those factors apply in parody cases, those recited in Elsmere. The first and second factors,
the purpose and the nature of the two works, are incorporated within the substantiality and
marketability ideas. This occurs as a result of the economic basis of the copyright laws. See
supra notes 18 and 43 and accompanying text. Since all works are theoretically of economic
importance to the author, lost sales are more likely to deter creativity than any other fact.
Lost sales are most likely where the copy substitutes for the original in the consumers' minds,
or so denegrates the original that the consumer no longer wishes to purchase it. See Leavens,
supra note 8, at 7-9. But see Comment, supra note 27, at 171-72.
126. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
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infringement charges for publishing a comic book which depicted "Dis-
ney characters as active members of a freethinking, promiscuous, drug-
ingesting counterculture."' 27 The Ninth Circuit rejected the fair use
defense because the easily conjured-up concept of Mickey Mouse and
friends did not allow for the substantial use which had occurred.' 2 The
court stressed that "excessive copying precludes fair use," and here the
"defendants took more than was necessary to place firmly in the reader's
mind the parodied work .... ,29 The court tried to separate the sub-
stantiality and substitution effect, 3 0 opting instead to reject the defense
solely because of the extensive copying. In so doing, the court failed to
realize that substantial copying is not a fair use because of the impact it
has on the marketability of the original. 1 3 ' The discounted factor in Air
Pirates was the obvious detrimental market effect an identical copy
would have.
What the Air Pirates court refused to recognize was made abun-
dantly clear in Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative
Productions.132 A stage musical titled "Scarlet Fever" parodied "Gone
With the Wind," using substantial portions of the original. The district
court noted that parody was of social value because of "the original per-
spective of the parodist,"'' 3 3 but held that the defendant's use of the origi-
nal was excessive. 134 Its analysis did not end there. The court went on to
note that the defendant's use of plaintiff's work fulfilled a potential deriv-
ative use. 135 The judge's reasoning was based primarily on the similarity
of entertainment functions the two uses served.' 36 Thus, the court was
willing to include speculative uses in derivative works as well as likely
uses. When combined with the reasoning in Air Pirates, it is clear that
parodies which are substantially similar will be found to infringe not
solely because of the amount of the original used in the parody, but be-
cause the ultimate effect will be a reduction in current or future sales or
marketability, either through degeneration or replacement, of the origi-
nal. In music, this effect can be even more severe.
Shortly after Showcase, the Second Circuit, in Elsmere Music, Inc. v.
127. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 753.
128. Id. at 757-58.
129. Id. at 758.
130. Id. at 756.
131. See generally 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 18, §§ 143.2, 145.
132. 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979). Leavens, supra note 8, at 19-20 criticizes the
court's method of analysis, but not its result.
133. Showcase, 479 F. Supp. at 357.
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National Broadcasting Co.,137 reconsidered the parody defense when the
creators of the "I Love New York" advertising song sued NBC for using
the tune in a Saturday Night Live sketch about the virtues of the biblical
city of Sodom. The sketch used the music of the jingle accompanied by
"I Love Sodom." This time the Second Circuit upheld a finding of fair
use, agreeing with the trial court that the amount used was no more than
"necessary to conjure up the original." '38 The Second Circuit's one-par-
agraph affirmation simply expressed that court's agreement that "copy-
right law should be hospitable to the humor of parody."' 39 In the only
footnote to the opinion the court also reaffirmed its view that a parody
will be permitted more extensive use where necessary, but only when
"the parody builds upon the original."'"
Elsmere is illustrative of a situation where a one-time use of a par-
ody was permitted while a prolonged use may not have been tolerated.
Such a use could have little or no commercial impact on the original
since its design is not to replace the original. Instead, the parody more
closely approaches the kind of fair use contemplated by the statute and
its history, one which promotes new and creative uses of the original
work.
That Elsmere was decided on its facts became abundantly clear soon
after when the Second Circuit again considered the parody defense. This
time, in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 4' the defendant's musical comedy in-
cluded a song entitled "The Cunnilingus Champion of Company C," par-
odying the popular song "The Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company
B." The defendant's purpose in parodying the song was found to include
commercial gain, since both were sold as recordings. 42 The effect on
marketability became obvious to the court when it noted that plaintiff
and defendant were competitors in the entertainment industry.'43 Thus,
the work of the parodist would compete directly with, and perhaps dis-
place, the original.
Wilson reflects the Second Circuit's continuing recognition that pos-
sible derivative uses are entitled to the same protection afforded likely
137. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
138. Elsmere, 482 F. Supp. at 747. In an important twist on a related issue, the district
court rejected prior reasoning which required the parody, to be valid, to criticize the work
copied (or something already identified with it). Instead, the court said, a court must decide
"whether the use in question is a valid satire or parody." Id. at 746.
139. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2nd Cir. 1980).
140. Id. at 253 n.1.
141. 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).




derivative uses. The dissent in Wilson evidently misses this point."' It
seems to agree with those who would argue that any parody will enhance
rather than diminish the value of the original. 45 It is not hard to imag-
ine the opposite. Properly parodied, any song, no matter how popular,
could seem ridiculous. The inevitable degeneration brought to the song,
even though the parody may be aimed at social attitudes or norms, could
lead to greatly decreased earnings-especially where the parody com-
petes directly with the original on a continuing basis.
A recent case which clearly integrates the issues raised when the fair
use defense of parody is asserted is D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Mon-
key Business, "' where the defendant's singing telegram company used
the likenesses of Superman and Wonderwoman for its telegram charac-
ters, Superstud and Wonderwench. Noting that the similarity of the
characters was "striking," Judge Shoob considered the amount taken to
be more than was necessary to conjure up the well-known images. 47
More importantly, though, was Judge Shoob's analysis of the potential
derivative uses which the plaintiff could make of its characters. Despite
the unlikelihood of entry by D.C. Comics, Inc., Judge Shoob included
the singing telegram market in the plaintiff's potential market.'48 In ad-
dition, defendant's use was found to be less criticism and more adapta-
tion. "'49 Such adaptations act only to trade "upon the imagination and
originality of another" and are not a fair use.'50 What Judge Shoob rec-
ognized in rejecting the fair use defense was that the intent of Monkey
Business was to create or enhance its own market "on the strength of
their association with [the] originals."'
5'
Finally, the most recent parody case, which considered musical par-
ody, Fisher v. Dees,"5 2 was decided by the Ninth Circuit in July of 1986.
Fisher and Segal, the composers of "When Sunny Gets Blue," had re-
fused to grant permission to Dees to use the music to their song for a
144. Id. at 188 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
145. See, e.g., Harmon, Recent Developments in Ninth Circuit Patent and Copyright Law, 10
GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 453, 464 (1980).
146. 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
147. D.C. Comics, 598 F. Supp. at 117-18.
148. Id. at 118.
149. Id. at 118-19. Judge Shoob claimed to have added a fifth factor to his analysis, beyond
Section 107's enumerated factors, but in actuality his fifth factor merely restates the substanti-
ality factor as a question of whether a work incidentally parodied the original versus whether
the parody amounted to mere adaptation-a derivative use. Id.
150. Id. at 119.
151. Id. See also MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443,448 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (citing a cast
member's testimony that "it would be funny if we could get 'Cunnilingus Champion' to sound
similar to 'Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy' just to create some publicity").
152. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
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"comedic and inoffensive version." '53 Dees produced the song anyway,
under the title "When Sunny Sniffs Glue." The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's summary judgment decision for Dees. After opining
that the song was apparently more than "a vehicle to achieve a comedic
objective unrelated to the song, its place and time" '54 (implying that in
the Ninth Circuit, also, a parody must also criticize the original work as
well as societal values), the court turned to the parody's economic effects.
The panel determined that "[iun assessing the economic effect of the par-
ody, [its] critical impact must be excluded." '55 Rejecting the view that a
parody should not aim at disparaging the original, the court legitimized
parodies which "'aim at garroting the original, destroying it commer-
cially as well as artistically.' "156 Instead of concerning itself with the
supply side of the economic equation, the court asked "whether [the par-
ody] fulfills the demand for the original." '157 In the case of "When Sunny
Sniffs Glue" the court held that because the two works did not fulfill the
same demand, "the parody ha[d] no cognizable economic effect on the
original." ' 8
By dismissing the economic effect factor completely the court left to
itself its traditional focal point, the amount and substantiality of the tak-
ing. Here, as in Air Pirates, the court made its determination that the
parody was a fair use based on the fact that it took "no more from the
original that [was] necessary to accomplish reasonably its parodic
purpose."1
59
Fisher leaves the Ninth Circuit in partial agreement with the Second
Circuit, but moves it yet further from the Supreme Court's emphasis on
market considerations. Viewed in the light of Harper & Row and Sony,
the Ninth Circuit's continued reliance on the amount and substantiality
of the taking in determining parodic fair use places its decisions on tenu-
ous grounds. Parody is still a form of fair use, and the Supreme Court
has made it clear that a fair use cannot exist where there is a significant
impact on the marketability (including the potential derivative uses) of
153. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 436.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 437.
156. Id. (quoting B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 69 (1967)). See also
Note, The Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement: Productive Fair Use After Betamax, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1411 (1984) (" 'Destructive' parodies play an important role in social
and literary criticism and thus merit protection even though they may discourage or discredit
an original author").
157. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 439.
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the original. I ° There is nothing in the Court's decisions which suggests
that the Ninth Circuit's analysis is appropriate. On the contrary, as
Harper & Row stated, the infringer's defense, even in a parody case,
must include a showing that the copyright holder's market would have
been damaged without the infringement. 61 The parodist's task would be
to show, in the Ninth Circuit's terms, that without infringing the original
the parody would still have "garrotted" the original. This adds a burden
far beyond the Ninth Circuit's. It does not imply a wholesale dismissal
of the critical effects of the parody, nor does it require that the parody
fulfill the demand for the original. Instead, it requires only that the two
uses compete in the same (or potentially same) market. For a musical
parody this could mean records, tapes, radio coverage, etc.
The current scheme of parody, as it fits within fair use, appears to
require of the parodist something more than a claim of criticism by hu-
mor. Despite commentators who argue that parody should be privileged
because of the unlikelihood that such uses would be authorized, 162 or
that parody's critical quality should be the focal point of a court's atten-
tion 163 and should thus receive protection where it criticizes some-
thing,"6 the courts have realized that more is at stake than an author's
ego. Although it is important that courts recognize parody as an expres-
sive form, 165 allowing wholesale use of a composition can have troubling
and injurious results.
The music industry is no longer a small business. Recorded sales
regularly number in the millions. Permitting parody of a song where the
net result is an exact duplicate of the score with different lyrics can only
serve to dilute the marketability of the original, as the two records com-
pete for much of the same market. It matters not at whom or what the
criticism, if any, is directed. 66 If the copyright laws are to succeed in
their purpose, the copyright owner must be reasonably sure, before he
writes his score, that copies of his work will not be permitted without his
consent.
As the cases reveal, it is often questionable whether the true intent
of the parody is criticism, or whether opting to use a familiar tune was
160. See supra notes 53-76 and accompanying text.
161. Harper & Row, 493 U.S. at 576.
162. E.g., Rosette, Burlesque as Copyright Infringement, 9 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP)
1, 27 (1956).
163. E.g., Comment, supra note 27.
164. Comment, Copyright Fair Use-Case Law and Legislation, 1969 DUKE L.J. 73, 106-07
(1969).
165. See Showcase, 479 F. Supp. at 357.
166. See Comment, supra note 27, at 184-86.
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simply a means of benefitting by virtue of association or familiarity."67 In
an effort to promote parody, some zealous commentators have attempted
to justify it in terms of its critical effect.' 68 But in so doing they have
often overlooked the fact that the fair use defense, as it relates to criti-
cism and comment, requires "a new, original and different literary" re-
sult. 69 The criticism must not amount to a derivative work. Parody,
especially musical parody, will always approach a derivative work unless
the parodist is careful to avoid exact or nearly exact duplications. It is
because of this fact that musical parody requires close scrutiny. While it
may be popular to suggest that criticism should flow freely at all
levels,1 70 musical parody hardly fulfills such an important function that
its critical effect alone justifies overriding the constitutional purposes of
the copyright laws. Weird Al Yenkowitch's (Yankovich) humorous
remakes of popular songs should hardly be a fair use simply because they
criticize something, especially when one considers the possible detriment
such a song, if unauthorized, could have on the marketability of the
original. 171
CONCLUSION
The economic implications of musical parody are increased as a re-
sult of the booming music market. Actions which cripple or severly
damage the returns a composer may receive should not be permitted
under the cloak of criticism. As with other forms of fair use, 17 2 musical
parody amounting to a verbatim copy of the score of a song should not
be a fair use. To allow such, based on its critical effect or intent, would
only subvert the goals of the copyright law to "promote the useful arts."
Often parody advocates overemphasize the relative value of the parody,
neglecting the value of the original. Without protecting the original com-
poser's right, however, the incentive to create the original may quickly
dissipate, leaving the would-be parodist unemployed.
167. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
168. See Comment, supra note 27, at 182-84. See also M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at
§ 13.05[B].
169. Columbia Pictures, 137 F. Supp. at 352.
170. See Comment, supra note 27.
171. Judge Shoob recognized this in D.C Comics when he noted that the damage done to
plaintiff's character images led defendant's use away from parody, not toward it. 598 F. Supp.
at 119.
172. See Walt Disney Prods., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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